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EU Foreign Policy and the 
Middle East
P a o l a  R i v e t t i  a n d  F r a n c e s c o  C a v a t o r t a
IntroductIon
Over the last two decades the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA), including Iran 
and Turkey, have acquired considerable 
importance for the European Union (EU). As 
the process of deepening and enlarging made 
the Union’s external relations more central to 
EU policy-making, the MENA region also 
went through a significant number of socio-
economic and political changes that influ-
enced the relations between the two. The rise 
of political Islam, the introduction of market-
oriented reforms, the resilience of authori-
tarianism and the periodic conflicts affecting 
some of the MENA states all contributed to 
raise the political interest of the EU policy-
making community towards the region 
because proximity provided the incentive for 
engaging with it more thoroughly and sys-
tematically beyond the traditional bilateral 
relations that EU member states conducted. 
In parallel with this greater political engage-
ment with the MENA, there has been a 
significant growth of academic studies on 
EU–Middle East relations and this area is 
currently flourishing due to the seemingly 
never ending dramatic events the MENA 
experiences, ranging from the emergence of 
terrorism to the Arab Awakening, from civil 
war to sectarianism and from hard security 
issues to the Arab–Israeli conflict.
ScholarShIp
Since the mid-1990s when the scholarship on 
EU–Middle East relations began to take off, 
the focus has been on a number of principal 
and recurring themes inextricably linked 
with the policy tools the EU designed and 
implemented in its relations with the MENA. 
It should be highlighted here that the onset of 
the relevant literature coincides with the 
launch in 1995 of the Euro–Mediterranean 
Partnership, also known as the Barcelona 
Process, because this was the first systemic 
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attempt on the part of the EU to conduct a 
somewhat united and coordinated foreign-
policy action towards the region. The 
Partnership was built on three different pil-
lars: the creation of a free-trade area that 
would ensure greater economic growth; cul-
tural exchanges destined to challenge the 
notion of the clash of civilisations that had 
emerged in the early 1990s following the 
work of Samuel Huntington and political 
cooperation that would contribute to the lib-
eralisation of societies and opening up of 
political systems on the southern bank of the 
Mediterranean. The rationale behind the 
Partnership was the overall promotion of 
regional stability through economic integra-
tion and democratization in a multilateral 
forum that included the whole of the EU and 
all the countries in the south, including Israel 
and excluding Libya. Two main factors moti-
vated the launch of the Partnership. First, the 
Algerian crisis of the early 1990s made EU 
policymakers aware of the political and secu-
rity challenges that might emerge from the 
region. Issues of instability, it was thought, 
could be solved through both political and 
economic liberalisation. The rise of radical 
Islamism with its anti-Western rhetoric and 
controversial political programme in Algeria 
and its subsequent electoral victory led the 
Algerian military to carry out a coup to keep 
Islamists out of power. The ensuing civil 
conflict brought to the world’s attention, and 
in particular to EU policymakers, the dangers 
of regional instability. The EU decided to 
engage with the MENA countries by export-
ing its own constitutive norms through the 
Barcelona Process given its commitment to 
and belief in democracy and the free market 
as instruments for conflict resolution, stabil-
ity and growth. Second, the peace process 
between Israel and the Palestinians saw the 
normalisation of relations between a number 
of Arab countries and Israel, inducing the EU 
to play a prominent role in strengthening 
cooperation through multilateralism.
Following the launch of the Barcelona 
process, the scholarship was preoccupied 
for quite some time with the evaluation of 
the three broad pillars of the Partnership and 
how they could be linked to a wider theoreti-
cal debate about the nature of the EU exter-
nal relations and the EU itself. In the context 
of this scholarship, the bulk of the attention 
has been devoted to the political, security and 
economic aspects of the Partnership, while 
the cultural one has been somewhat margin-
alised. More specifically, the post-Barcelona 
process literature can be divided into four 
clusters of analysis.
First, a significant number of studies have 
been dedicated to the economic dimension 
of the relationship between the EU and the 
Middle East with a focus on the costs and ben-
efits of the progressive liberalisation of trade 
and the creation of a free trade area (Brach, 
2007). Broadly speaking, studies have been 
critical of the way in which the EU pushed 
economic liberalisation and the strategies of 
development designed for its MENA partners 
(Holden, 2010). This criticism, however, is 
not necessarily based on the poor economic 
performances of many MENA countries fol-
lowing liberalisation in so far as the macro-
economic indicators point to rather constant 
and consistent growth over time. The central 
criticism has to do with the effects of eco-
nomic liberalisation on wider society and 
the political systems of the MENA states. 
In other words, although the MENA econo-
mies as a whole benefited from the increase 
in exchanges with the EU in a freer trading 
environment and from the domestic reforms 
that were carried out, the necessity to push 
these reforms through made the MENA gov-
ernments more authoritarian (Cavatorta and 
Durac, 2009). Under these authoritarian con-
straints, the benefits of economic integration 
did not trickle down; quite the contrary, a 
small elite benefited significantly from them, 
generating the anti-neoliberal backlash that 
characterised the Arab Awakening of 2010–
11 (Chomiak and Entelis, 2011). Access to 
energy resources features prominently in 
these debates (Bahgat, 2010) in so far as the 
majority of EU economies rely on oil and 
gas coming from the region. In this context, 
the Qaddafi-led Libya case is particularly 
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significant because of the aggressive pro-
motion of linkages with a country that had 
faced enormous criticism and ostracism for 
its domestic and foreign policies. Scholars 
have indeed noticed that although the EU 
had excluded Libya from multilateral fora 
with the other Middle Eastern countries, 
it has deliberately ignored issues such as 
human rights violations in order to keep on 
purchasing Libya’s energy (Bahgat, 2009; 
Lutterbeck, 2009; Menon, 2011).
Second, a significant number of analyses, 
particularly after 11 September 2001, have 
dealt with security issues that the Partnership 
was supposed to address. In the context of 
EU–Middle East relations, security has been 
broadly conceived, encompassing issues 
ranging from political instability due to the 
rise of Islamism to terrorism and from the 
arms race to migration. However, for the last 
two decades, the focus of both policymak-
ers and academics has been mainly on the 
rise of Islamism (Youngs, 2006). Although 
in policy-making circles Islamism has been 
broadly perceived as an inherently destabilis-
ing factor, academic studies have attempted 
to problematise this notion, suggesting that 
it is a phenomenon that should be better 
understood and potentially engaged with. 
Migration has also been central to academic 
studies because on the one hand it is per-
ceived as a threat to the stability of European 
societies and on the other it is a developmen-
tal factor for both host societies and send-
ing countries (Gallina, 2007). A more recent 
security threat that attracted scholarly atten-
tion is the regional arms race, with a clear 
focus on Iran’s nuclear programme and sub-
sequent fears of proliferation. Although the 
Partnership was not designed to include such 
crucial hard security themes and Iran is not 
part of the Barcelona process, the progres-
sive coordination of external relations on the 
part of the EU forced it in some ways to deal 
with the Iranian nuclear issue. In this respect, 
scholarship has been preoccupied with iden-
tifying the way in which the EU is different in 
its approach to the US and how it has engaged 
with Iran on that basis (Bergenäs, 2010; 
Kaussler, 2012). In any case, security matters 
have acquired more importance for the EU 
since the mid-2000s, as demonstrated by the 
negotiations with Syria over the Association 
Agreement when issues related to hard secu-
rity, namely chemical and biological weap-
ons, were openly discussed (Cavatorta and 
Gomez Arana, 2010).
Third, an almost endless number of 
analyses and empirical studies focused on 
the political dimension of the Partnership, 
in particular on the issues of democratisa-
tion and democracy-promotion, which were 
absolutely crucial to the whole construction 
of the European Mediterranean Partnership 
and its successors, such as the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (Seeberg, 2009) and 
Union for the Mediterranean, which can be 
considered an attempt to take on board criti-
cism of and improve on it (Special Issue – 
Mediterranean Politics, 2011). Thus, there 
are numerous works on the way in which 
the EU has attempted to promote democracy 
and human rights in a region where political 
authoritarianism prevailed for a long time and 
is still enduring, despite the Arab Spring 
(Boserup and Tassinari, 2012). The vast 
majority of academic work on this topic has 
been very critical of the way in which the 
EU promoted democracy and human rights 
(Pace et al. 2009), with scholars identifying 
different explanations for this, ranging from 
poor policy coordination among members 
(Bicchi, 2007) to inherent contradictions in 
the Partnership (Pace, 2009; Del Sarto and 
Schumacher, 2011) and from the mistaken 
assumption of EU normativity (Powel, 2009; 
Cavatorta et al. 2008) to the ability of MENA 
regimes in place to withstand external pres-
sure because of the knowledge that such 
pressure was not genuine (Hollis, 2005).
Finally, as mentioned earlier, the 
Partnership was meant to politically 
strengthen the Arab–Israeli peace process and 
underpin its success through the provision of 
material incentives to all sides involved. One 
of the very ideas of the Euro–Mediterranean 
Partnership was to have Israel in a multilat-
eral forum together with the vast majority of 
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Arab countries to foster peaceful multilateral 
dynamics that could have a positive spill-
over in the relations between Israel and the 
Arab world (Del Sarto, 2007). Ultimately, 
this political strategy did not work because 
of the developments on the ground in Israel–
Palestine and because of the inability of 
the EU to take a unified stand on the issue. 
Scholarly work has indeed highlighted the 
inability of the EU to move beyond rhetori-
cal support for international legality, which 
would favour the Palestinian position, due 
to the internal divisions that member states 
display when it comes to Israeli policies in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Tocci, 
2009; Peters, 2010).
Beyond these clusters mentioned in the 
context of the Barcelona Process, there are a 
number of studies on bilateral relations and 
on the reasons why the European countries 
are not able to come up with shared positions 
on a range of issues vis à vis the MENA. The 
Barcelona Process has been the central focus 
of scholarship, and one of the main observa-
tions that emerged from studies related to the 
shortcomings and difficulties of its implemen-
tation has to do with the consistent inability 
of the EU to come up with a coherent, cogent 
and united European policy towards the 
MENA on a number of issues. It follows that 
some scholars began to look into the way in 
which individual states might be responsible 
for such state of affairs, suggesting that bilat-
eral relations between a specific EU country 
and a specific MENA country with respect to 
any given issue might be much more impor-
tant than the multilateral ones. This is partic-
ularly evident in the case of security issues 
that the EU has approached in a fragmented 
way, even if it was done nominally under 
the banner of Europe. For instance, this is 
the case for the Iranian nuclear negotiations, 
which have been conducted by Germany, 
France and the UK (the EU-3) with Russia, 
China and the US (the P5+1), for the Madrid 
Quartet as in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict 
and finally for the European approach to the 
Gulf Council Cooperation. By discussing the 
European posture in these different cases, 
scholars have highlighted the preference for 
bilateral or specific agreements on the part 
of the leading European countries and to the 
absence of a shared position on a number of 
issues (Kirchner, 2006; Menon, 2011).
SIgnIfIcance of the fIeld of Study
The scholarship on EU–Middle East rela-
tions contributes to a number of broad and 
intense debates related to the nature of EU 
foreign-policy-making and the EU itself. 
Despite their relative young age, studies on 
the EU–Middle East relations have brought 
about significant changes in how the EU is 
analysed because of the extremely controver-
sial nature of the political decisions that have 
been made in Europe when it comes to the 
MENA region.
The most significant contribution has been 
to the overarching debate on the nature of 
EU power and, specifically, whether the EU 
displays normative power or, alternatively, 
a realist one. Authors generally attempt to 
demonstrate the validity of one theoretical 
conceptualisation over the other by testing 
the way in which the EU approaches key 
issues in the region and its constituent states, 
generating an enormous amount of empiri-
cal evidence that is then turned into support 
for a specific theoretical position. On the one 
hand, we find studies confirming the valid-
ity of the normative power approach utilising 
concepts such as Europeanization (Müftüler-
Bac and Gürsoy, 2010) and multilateral insti-
tutionalisation. For instance, a number of 
studies highlight how the positive influence 
of the EU has contributed to Turkish democ-
ratisation and, in turn, to its softer stances in 
international politics due to the necessity to 
conform to EU standards and to the benefits 
that this brings about (Special issue – Journal 
of Southern Europe and Balkans, 2007). In 
addition, there are studies underlining the 
osmosis of norms from the EU to MENA 
countries on very specific issues such as 
women’s rights, as the case of the family code 
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reform in 2004 in Morocco demonstrates 
(Dalmasso and Cavatorta, 2010). It should 
be underlined, however, that such studies are 
few and far between because the overwhelm-
ing evidence emerging from the region points 
to the failure of such osmosis taking place on 
a significant scale. On the other hand, there 
are studies arguing that the end goals and 
instruments of the EU in the region respond 
to classic realist interests and concept of 
power (Hyde-Price, 2006). It follows there-
fore that analyses of the pillars of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership or the content of 
European Neighbourhood Policy agreements 
tend to highlight contradictions that are not 
simply the result of poor policy coordina-
tion or unfortunate circumstances, but are the 
direct outcome of the intention of the EU to 
operate as an amoral realist actor, despite 
its normative rhetoric. Numerous examina-
tions of EU security policy, for instance, 
underscore how it has contributed willingly 
to the strengthening of authoritarian rule in 
the name of the War on Terror or the control 
of migration flows (Toje, 2005) because it 
is only with the cooperation of authoritar-
ian regimes that the objective of the EU can 
be achieved. Also, analyses of the economic 
exchanges between the EU and the Middle 
East suggest that the EU is a rather exploit-
ative actor benefiting from positive commer-
cial ties because of its power. The theoretical 
struggle between normativity and realism 
when it comes to the EU is particularly sig-
nificant because of the broad assumptions 
that have been made traditionally about the 
nature of the EU. The notion of normativity 
is very much the constitutive norm through 
which the EU is understood, and any prob-
lematisation of the concept or rejection tends 
to throw the literature in turmoil (Pace, 2007, 
2009). The scholarship on EU–Middle East 
relations has been extremely influential in 
doing this and the vast majority of studies 
in this field, whether intentionally or not, tend 
to side with the often minoritarian view that 
the EU is far from being a normative actor 
or the good guy of international politics. This 
view today is more acceptable and accepted 
because of the work of scholars of EU–
Middle East relations, who have been able to 
shed the assumption of normativity over time 
and embrace a more challenging and unpopu-
lar perspective that ultimately explains what 
the EU does in the MENA region and how 
it does it better (Tocci, 2009). The relevance 
of the debate between normativity and real-
ism as the frameworks through which the 
EU should be studied has tended to fade over 
recent years because of its increasing steril-
ity to the extent that it is no longer academi-
cally productive. It is now too simplistic to 
start from a theoretical stance and then look 
for evidence that either supports or negates 
the validity of a theoretical approach that 
would encompass what the EU is and does, 
and implicitly negates the complexity of EU 
external policy-making, which may respond 
to and be explained by multiple theoretical 
frameworks. It is for this reason that what 
is termed ‘post-normativism’ has emerged 
as a development in the literature, whereby 
the debate has shifted away from the nature 
of the EU towards what the EU does in prac-
tice and in every MENA state (Zorob, 2008), 
thereby allowing theoretical flexibility. This 
implies a much more in-depth analysis of the 
empirics that emerge from examining how 
the EU engages specific countries and which 
policy instruments are employed. The goal is 
not to substantiate a specific theoretical per-
spective that would be valid for all time and 
places, but to provide a much more complex 
picture of the nature of EU external relations 
that cannot entirely be accredited solely to 
normativity or realism (Youngs, 2006). The 
concept that emerges more forcefully from 
post-normativism is pragmatism, which 
seems to offer the conceptual tool through 
which EU engagement in the region can be 
assessed. Pragmatism is informed by both 
normativity and realism, but constitutes a 
separate analytical entity, which benefits 
from constructivist ideas about the way in 
which the EU thinks of itself, how it projects 
its external relations and how it is capable 
of adapting to the unique challenges and 
circumstances that each MENA state offers 
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(Special Issue – European Foreign Affairs 
Review, 2010).
The second contribution of the scholarship 
speaks to another fundamental question that 
is not only crucial for EU external relations, 
but for other policy-making areas as well: 
who is really in charge of EU foreign-policy-
making? The Middle East is a challenging 
region where numerous hard and soft secu-
rity matters have to be dealt with and where 
changes have come about rapidly and often 
times dramatically. The EU has attempted to 
formulate coherent policies on these matters 
and to unify potentially diverging positions 
among member states. As mentioned earlier, 
it is fair to argue that the results have been 
disappointing, leading specialists in the field 
to point to a number of institutional weak-
nesses that the EU suffers. Furthermore, 
some of the European countries have post-
colonial ties with Middle Eastern countries, 
and this makes a general, European approach 
far more difficult to be adopted for individual 
states who enjoy exclusive relations with for-
mer colonies based on the sustenance and per-
petuation of patronage networks. Operating 
in a multilateral context is therefore far more 
complex because there are parallel relations 
between certain EU member states and for-
mer colonies that transcend multilateralism 
and could be far more significant in terms 
of economic and political issues. The very 
nature of the issues that the MENA region 
has highlighted would require a clear, rapid 
and coherent response on the part of the 
EU, but this has not yet materialised and the 
scholarship recognises this particular failure. 
As a result, studies on EU–Middle East rela-
tions have informed the broader scholarship 
on actorness and agency within the EU in 
addressing the actual role of the EU at times 
when important decisions have to be made. 
A number of examples related to specific 
issues the EU has dealt – and is still dealing 
with – should suffice to clarify this point. 
Scholars have emphasised how the 2003 
invasion of Iraq divided the EU member 
states and how, consequently, the EU was 
marginalised due to its inability to reconcile 
diverging positions (Chari and Cavatorta, 
2003). The same divisions exist when it 
comes to dealing with the Arab–Israeli con-
flict, where the strong views of some mem-
ber states prevent the EU from presenting a 
common position on the issue. More recent 
events, such as the Arab Uprisings and the 
war in Libya, have further highlighted divi-
sions and the inconsistence of the attitude 
on foreign policy of the single European 
countries. This is the case of the French rec-
ognition of the Libyan Transitional Council 
in March 2011 as the sole legitimate power 
in the North African country, a move which 
was made disturbingly early and hastily for 
the other EU members who were still eval-
uating and discussing what should be done 
and what joint position should be taken. The 
resolute attitude taken by Paris caused criti-
cism and bitterness among the allies (Menon, 
2011). European states have similar difficul-
ties in the case of the Iranian nuclear issue, 
and the manner in which negotiations have 
taken place is evidence of this. The rounds of 
negotiations that see Iranian foreign-policy 
officials meeting with EU counterparts often 
have no significant outcomes because the 
EU’s mandate is extremely limited due to the 
divergences between member states with dif-
ferent attitudes and conflicting agendas vis à 
vis Iran and its nuclear programme (Hamish, 
2007; Dryburgh, 2008). Thus, the scholarship 
in the field – possibly because the issues aris-
ing from the region are so contentious, cru-
cial and difficult – points decisively to the EU 
structural and institutional problems in light 
of the domineering role of some member 
states when it comes to foreign policy in the 
region. In turn, these weaknesses have high-
lighted similar ones in other policy-areas and 
reopened the debate about the submissive-
ness of European institutions to the interests 
of the ‘big powers’ within them (Harnisch, 
2007). This has had profound repercussions 
on broader studies of agency within the EU, 
which the financial crisis has made all the 
more relevant in the current climate of divi-
sions among member states (Whitman and 
Juncos, 2012).
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This debate feeds into the third contri-
bution that the scholarship has made to the 
wider understanding of the relationship 
between the EU and multilateralism. The 
EU project has traditionally been a multilat-
eral one with norms and ideas about democ-
racy, peace, human rights and economic 
integration being the foundation upon which 
stability and conflict-resolution could be 
built. Multilateral external relations have 
therefore always been privileged within 
EU policy-making circles in contributing to 
peace and stability worldwide. It follows 
that much of EU foreign-policy-making 
in the Middle East is predicated on the 
attempt to establish regional institutions fos-
tering multilateral cooperation. These fora, 
be they the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership 
or the Union for the Mediterranean, would 
serve as arenas to discuss and manage issues 
of common interest to countries on both 
sides of the Mediterranean and hopefully 
make the Mediterranean an area of democ-
racy and shared prosperity. Although such 
multilateral fora have achieved a degree of 
success in some technical areas where coop-
eration has indeed occurred, the scholarship 
generally points to weaknesses and short-
comings, which, in turn, affect the broader 
debate about the genuine commitment to 
multilateralism of the EU when concrete 
material interests have to be promoted or 
defended. The supposed commitment to 
and effectiveness of multilateralism there-
fore contradicts the employment, to a great 
degree, of bilateral tools in dealing with 
Middle East countries, and allowing for a 
broader questioning of not only EU policies, 
but also of the theoretical underpinnings of 
multilateralism itself (Echagüe et al., 2011). 
Studies of relations between the EU and 
individual MENA countries suggest that 
when bilateralism prevails, the EU benefits 
much more greatly than the partner country 
because of the power differentials that exist 
(Special Issue – European Foreign Affairs 
Review, 2010). This finding also links back 
and feeds into the discussion over the true 
nature of EU power.
Finally, a further debate informing broader 
scholarship on the EU is the transatlantic 
relation. Since the end of the Cold War, both 
policymakers and academics have been pre-
occupied with the nature of the transatlantic 
relation and the seemingly increasing diver-
gence of interests and values between the 
EU and the US. Since the wars in the former 
Yugoslavia, there have been studies suggest-
ing the existence of a so-called transatlantic 
rift, which is supposedly driving the EU and 
the US in progressively different directions 
over a number of crucial issues ranging from 
trade to the environment and from human 
rights to engagement with rogue states. 
A simple and possibly simplistic picture 
emerged from these studies, whereby the US 
was becoming increasingly unipolar, unin-
terested in multilateralism and committed 
more to the use of violence than diplomacy, 
while the EU was progressively more idealis-
tic and committed to the solution of conflicts 
through multilateralism and aid. In short, 
‘Americans were from Mars and Europeans 
from Venus’ (Kagan, 2002). Although this 
view did not enjoy the consensus of the com-
munity of scholars, it nevertheless influ-
enced the way in which the scholarship of 
the EU–Middle East relations analysed how 
the EU and the US behaved in the region in 
order to draw some broader lessons about 
the supposed transatlantic rift (Smith, 2009). 
Beginning in particular with the war in Iraq 
of 2003, increasing attention was given to the 
divergence between the European position 
and the American one, but the problem is that 
this supposed divergence rested on the prem-
ise that the EU would be capable of behav-
ing as a unified actor. This was far from the 
reality and when the individual positions of 
EU member states with respect to the war in 
Iraq were analysed, what emerged was that 
some countries were very close to the US 
position, while others radically disagreed 
with it. In a sense, there was nothing to com-
pare because the EU did not act as a unified 
actor. Despite this, what emerges from ana-
lysing how the US and the EU behave in the 
Middle East is an empirics-based validation 
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of the argument that the transatlantic rift does 
not exist. Although the two actors sometimes 
have different policies and employ different 
tools to engage with the region, the general 
objectives are shared and a high degree of 
consultation and consensus-building exists. 
This has important implications on how one 
looks at the role of the EU in the wider inter-
national political scene to the extent that the 
EU does not seem to represent a challenge 
for the US, but rather an actor that willingly 
‘bandwagons’ despite sometimes utilising 
different rhetoric and policy instruments 
(Everts, 2004; Special Issue – Journal of 
North African Studies, 2009).
the way forward
The scholarship on EU–Middle East rela-
tions over the last two decades has accom-
plished significant achievements because it 
expanded our knowledge of a previously 
limited area of research, contributing in the 
process to the broader fields of International 
Relations and European Studies. There are 
four significant achievements that should be 
highlighted.
First and foremost, it has challenged the 
prevailing view of the EU as a normative 
power. Unlike the studies on EU foreign 
policy towards Latin America or East/Central 
Europe, the Middle East constitutes a pro-
found challenge for normative Europe, which 
has been demonstrated in the literature by the 
assumption that normativity does not explain 
EU external relations in the MENA. This has 
resulted in a much stronger scrutiny of EU 
foreign policies elsewhere and a wider ques-
tioning of the way in which supranational 
institutions operate in general, suggesting 
that there may be more to them than a tradi-
tional liberal understanding.
Second, the scholarship in this field has 
contributed to a greater understanding of 
how multilateral instruments of coopera-
tion work in practice. Although there is a 
widespread theoretical assumption about 
the benefits of multilateralism, it is useful to 
examine how the practical implementation of 
such instruments functions. The vast array of 
studies on the different aspects of the Euro–
Mediterranean Partnership, the European 
Neighbourhood Policy and the Union for the 
Mediterranean have informed this debate on 
the mechanisms of multilateralism. The way 
in which multilateral cooperation occurs 
and what are its strengths and weaknesses, 
particularly in the context of controversial 
issues such as economic liberalisation and 
democracy promotion, has been crucial for 
a re-evaluation of the EU stances. In addi-
tion, such re-evaluation has been extremely 
beneficial for policy-making debates to the 
extent that the practical consequences of 
these studies are taken into account in policy- 
making circles. Any area of study aims at 
being ‘translated’ into real changes, and the 
literature on EU–Middle East relations is no 
exception. It is to the credit of all scholars 
in this field that there have been significant 
changes made over time in the actual EU 
approach to the region. Although scepticism 
still surrounds EU policy-making – even in 
the aftermath of the Arab Awakening – and of 
how it has been dealt with in Brussels (Teti, 
2012), there is no denying that the criticism 
of the scholarship towards specific assump-
tions about MENA politics have been taken 
on board, above all the necessity to engage 
with all local political actors, including the 
Islamists.
Third, the scholarship has questioned the 
validity of the assumption of the transatlan-
tic rift between the US and the EU because 
empirical studies of security issues and 
democratization policies have identified sim-
ilar goals and means to achieve them.
Finally, the scholarship has provided 
further and interesting empirical evidence 
about the power of Europeanization in very 
specific contexts. Studies on the conditions 
under which Europeanization occurs have 
been influenced by empirical and theoretical 
examinations of how EU values and norms 
have affected specific countries in the region 
or specific issues such as women’s rights or 
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minority rights. This is most evident in stud-
ies of Turkish domestic and international 
politics.
These powerful theoretical and empiri-
cal accomplishments should not obscure the 
weaknesses that the scholarship still pres-
ents. There are three significant shortcom-
ings. First is that the theoretical debate about 
the true nature of the EU still informs too 
many studies on EU–Middle East relations. 
Although the debate is certainly important 
and contributed extensively to the wider 
discussion about EU foreign policy, it has 
become, to a certain extent, sterile due to the 
large number of studies. There is therefore 
the need for greater engagement with other 
theoretical traditions and perspectives that 
can capture the sheer complexity of the EU 
and what it does in the region. It is no longer 
sufficient to argue that the EU is a normative, 
idealist or realist actor and then proceed to 
examine whether this is reflected in practice 
or not. The empirical work runs the risk of 
becoming so specialised that it is no longer 
interesting because the EU has grown both 
externally and internally in complexity, pre-
venting a simple and neat understanding 
of it. As mentioned, there are some stud-
ies attempting to go beyond this dichotomy 
and utilising concepts such as pragmatism, 
but even this is no longer satisfactory. What 
is encouraging however is that there are an 
increasing number of studies that deal with 
individual countries rather than the region 
as a whole or a specific policy area. This 
development should be further encouraged 
because it allows scholars to examine more 
closely what the EU does in specific contexts, 
therefore taking into account the specifics of 
the country in question. This helps overcome 
an Orientalist approach, which assimilates 
countries in the region into a coherent whole 
that in practice does not exist, and also per-
mits exploring how the EU engages with 
countries that have different geo-strategic 
importance, regimes, socio-economic institu-
tions and resources.
The second shortcoming is the paucity of 
systematic studies dealing with the relations 
between the EU and the Gulf countries, 
despite the importance of the linkages they 
have, notably in the energy and security 
domains. Although some scholars have 
attempted to engage with this (Nonnemann, 
2006), it appears that there is a reluctance to 
study EU–Gulf countries relations for a num-
ber of reasons. First, there is the issue of the 
perceived impenetrability of European norms 
and values in the Gulf. Why focus on a region 
of the globe where it is clear that EU nor-
mativity does not play any significant role? 
Conversely, why concentrate on the Gulf 
states when it is clear that realism dominates 
the EU’s political approach? Although this 
may be true, it represents a return to the way 
in which the EU is assumed to be as an actor 
on the world scene, and neglects that there 
might be specific and unintended reactions 
to specific challenges. Second, there is a ten-
dency to look at the Gulf as a coherent whole 
rather than a number of distinct countries 
that may have similarities, but also profound 
differences and even rivalries. Studies are 
therefore often conducted to see whether and 
how the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
might develop in some sort of EU rather 
than examining the type of the engagement 
the EU has with individual countries. Third, 
there is the energy resources aspect that 
seems to dominate thinking about the Gulf, 
preventing scholars from looking at factors 
and actors that have nothing to do with the 
energy issue. The Gulf is likely to become 
increasingly relevant, not only to the political 
power balance in the MENA region, but also 
to the wider region, including Afghanistan. 
The withdrawal of the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) from Afghanistan in 
2014 opens a new scenario of uncertainty in 
which the regional competition between the 
GCC and Iran is likely to increase. This is 
particularly relevant in the context of an envi-
ronment where sectarian and religious divi-
sions are becoming more prominent, partially 
as a consequence of the Syrian civil war. 
The Sunni–Shia divide is indeed widening 
and few responses to it have been prepared 
by the international community and the EU. 
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In such a context, the Syrian civil war is 
likely to become a spark that can light up 
broader conflicts and enmities, while tradi-
tional divisions among EU member states 
prevent a stronger and meaningful role of the 
EU in conflict-resolution.
The third shortcoming, despite its crucial 
relevance, is the shying away from studying 
the EU engagement in the Arab–Israeli con-
flict more systematically. There are numerous 
studies dealing with it at a rather superficial 
and descriptive level, but very few in-depth 
theoretical and empirical discussions about 
it. There is no doubt that the Arab–Israeli 
conflict constitutes an extremely challenging 
issue for policymakers and scholars because 
of the passions that the conflict tends to raise. 
There is reluctance on the part of scholars to 
be seen in any way as partisan in this conflict, 
and mainstream scholarship has therefore 
developed a descriptive body of knowledge 
but very little in terms of analysis and expla-
nation. Furthermore, the turmoil in Egypt and 
the civil war in Syria are two factors urging 
scholarly attention back to this issue.
This overview of the scholarship on EU–
Middle East relations would not be complete 
without references to the Arab Awakening 
and how it speaks to the field as a whole. The 
Arab Awakening has challenged a number of 
preconceptions about Arab politics and soci-
eties that EU–Middle East relations’ experts 
should take into account. At times, there has 
been a difficult relationship between EU 
and area study experts, whereby simplis-
tic assumptions have informed the way in 
which the MENA has been approached. In 
particular, this is valid for the tendency that 
both scholarly communities have displayed 
when it comes to the supposedly normative 
power and success of the EU programs of 
democracy promotion. A closer collabora-
tion between the two communities could 
have allowed to better address the hidden 
implications, and unintended consequences 
of such programs and economic liberalisa-
tion because these two initiatives have not 
delivered the expected outcome, namely a 
gradual move towards liberal democracy. 
On the contrary, they have caused mass 
upheaval and the toppling of dictators 
friendly with the EU. A closer relationship 
between the studies focusing on EU and 
area studies could highlight crucial dynam-
ics that have been largely overlooked. The 
Arab Awakening also represents an oppor-
tunity to better understand and explain the 
influence that EU policies may have had in 
the region and, consequently, to reformulate 
policies. What has been found is that the 
push for the adoption of neo-liberal eco-
nomic reforms has been thoroughly rejected 
by the new social and political actors in the 
region in the aftermath of the uprisings. This 
has implications not only for the EU, which 
has been promoting such reforms, but also 
for the linkage between neo-liberalism and 
democracy (Rivetti, 2013). In fact, conten-
tious politics and democratic engagement 
have emerged because of the abject failure of 
neo-liberalism. This has been a paradoxical 
outcome – from the point of view of many 
studies based on the assumption that mar-
ket reforms would generate democracy and 
which have been proven ironically right for 
the wrong reason. Studies have also found 
that there is a political and scholarly neces-
sity to better understand the rise of Islamist 
parties, what they are and how they operate. 
Once again, simplistic assumptions about 
their views and policies should be aban-
doned in favour of critical engagement. The 
rise of Islamists in many countries has also 
led scholars to rethink the prominence of the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as a model 
for all the Islamist parties and movements 
in the region. The attention that the rise of 
Salafism throughout the region has attracted 
is evidence of the positive development of 
the scholarship in this direction, albeit a 
recent one (Haugbølle and Cavatorta, 2012; 
Philbrick Yadav, 2013). Studies examining 
the security aspect of the region need to be re-
evaluated accordingly in this new scenario. 
Finally, and crucially, the rhetorical EU 
engagement for democracy and human rights 
needs to be reframed in a new discourse that 
moves away from Orientalist assumptions 
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and followed up by actions (Hanau Santini 
and Hassan, 2012). This also means that 
the scholarly community has to attempt to 
move beyond institutionalism and critically 
re-examine its fundamental assumptions in 
light of the most recent events. Indeed, the 
case of the EU–MENA relations in the after-
math of the Arab Awakening highlights that 
part of the assumptions of institutionalism 
are wrong because actual political and social 
dynamics may go beyond the institutions’ 
plans and expectations. Institutionalism rests 
on problematic assumptions because, as in 
the case of the EU–MENA relations, there 
are few concrete efforts for policy coordina-
tion following statements of goodwill on the 
part of the single European countries. The 
most significant contribution of EU–Middle 
East scholarship has been to expose the 
gap between the rhetoric and the reality of 
democracy promotion. Today, both scholars 
and policymakers within the EU are aware 
of the existence of such gap and it is time to 
begin reducing it.
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